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STOP AND FRISK
verified by discovery of the gun, it could be argued
that the arrest meets the degree of informer credi-
bility needed for establishing probable cause. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court in United
States v. Harris,2s stated:
[Tihe inquiry is, as it always must be in determin-
ing probable cause, whether the informant's
present information is truthful or reliable.. .. 21
The informant in Adams had given the officer
two'present facts concerning Williams;3 the first
proved true and thereb) established probable
cause for believing that the second was correct.3'
- 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
" Id. at 582.
10 One, that Williams had a pistol in his waistband
and two, that he possessed narcotics. 407 U.S. at 145.
3 Cf. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
An informant told police that a man would get off a
Therefore, Marshall's argument that, even if the
stop and frisk were legal there was no probable
cause, does not seem justified.
Adams v. Williams has extended stop and frisk
by holding that an informant who has previously
given unsubstantiated information, may, under
certain circumstances, provide sufficient informa-
tion to legitimize a stop and frisk. It is, therefore,
necessary that the courts carefully scrutinize stop
and frisk cases, to insure that the stop and frisk
was properly motivated.
train at a certain time, carrying heroin. The informant
provided police with a detailed description of the
suspect. The police observed a man meeting the precise
description at the specified time, and arrested him. The
Court held that the informant's information, which
had been corroborated before the arrest, constituted
reasonable grounds to believe that the suspect did
possess heroin.
RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
DuRRxA RULE DISCARWED
The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia unanimously discarded the
Durham rule for the definition of mental respon-
sibility in criminal cases and adopted in its place
the standard of the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code. In United States v. Brawner,
- F.2d - (D. C. Cir. 1972), the court reversed a
murder conviction that was decided under the
Durham rule and remanded the case to the trial
court to consider whether the defendant should be
retried under the ALI test. The District of Colum-
bia Circuit, which promulgated the Durham rule,
thus joined the other federal courts of appeals in
adopting the ALI test.
The Durham rule absolved defendants of re-
sponsibility for any crime "committed as a product
of a mental defect or disease." 2 The court felt
that the Durham rule had not worked because of
the opportunity it gave expert witnesses to in-
fluence the jury. Section 4.01 of the Model Penal
Code states:
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct
if at the time of such conduct as a result of men-
tal disease or defect he lacks substantial ca-
pacity either to appreciate the criminality of
See Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D C.
Cir. 1954).
2Id. at 875.
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the re-
quirements of the law.
(2) The terms "mental disease or defect" do not
include an abnormality manifested only by
repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial con-
duct.
The second paragraph excludes a defense for the
psychopathic personality.
Judge Leventhal, writing for the court, stated
that experts will be permitted to testify as to the
existence of mental disease and will be requested to
present the reasons for their conclusions. The
court expressly retained the definition adopted in
McDomald v. United States' that a mental disease
or defect is any abnormal condition of the mind
which substantially affects mental or emotional
processes and substantially affects behavior con-
trols. The Brawner opinion also includes jury
instructions which incorporate the ALI test.
The court rejected alternative proposals ad-
vanced in amici curiae briefs by the American
Psychiatric Association, the American Civil Lib-
erties Union, the National District Attorneys
Association, and the National Legal Aid and De-
fenders Associates. Among the suggestions con-
sidered and discarded was the possibility that the
insanity defense be abolished altogether.
Chief Judge Bazelon, author of the Durham
opinion, concurred in the result, although he felt
3 312 F.2d 847 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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that the change was one of form rather than sub-
stance. He agreed that the Durham rule had failed
to alter what he termed "a musty doctrine." 4
He believed that the practical operation of the
defense is controlled by the quality of counsel, the
attitude of the judge, the ability of expert wit-
nesses, and the adequacy of the pre-trial mental
examination.5
RIGHT OF SELF REPRESENTATION
Courts are still divided on the question of
whether there is a constitutional right to defend
charges pro se. The United States Supreme Court
has never decided the issue.
The California Supreme Court, in People v.
Sharp, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972),
refused to reverse the larceny conviction of a de-
fendant who was not allowed to conduct his own
defense. The unanimous court suggested that
there might be cases in which denial of the right to
do without counsel would deprive a defendant of
a fair trial or due process, but this was not one of
those cases.
The court pointed out that in American colonial
times self representation was commonplace, the
concern being with the right not to be compelled
to employ and pay counsel. However, the court
felt that .social and judicial changes during the
last 200 years require greater limitation on the
right of self representation. The court reasoned
that the guarantee of competent counsel and su-
pervision of the quality of counsel in California
have largely rendered any right of self represen-
tation unnecessary.
The court ruled that due process does not
foreclose waiver of right to counsel in certain cases,
and that the sixth amendment does not prohibit
the right of self representation.6 The court held
that there was no constitutional right to proceed
pro se at trial.
In United States v. Dougherty, - F.2d - (D.C.
Cir. 1972), the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia stated that the right to
4 F.2d at.
'Id. at _.6499 P.2d at 496.
no counsel is almost as important as the right to
counsel. The court reversed the burglary and prop-
erty destruction convictions of several activist
clerics who were not permitted to present their
own defense to charges of raiding a napalm man-
ufacture's office. Basing its holding on the federal
statutory right to represent oneself,/ the court did
not reach the question of whether the right is con-
stitutionally protected.
The court stated that the right to self represen-
tation must be recognized if it is timely asserted,
if there is a valid waiver of counsel and if it is not
accompanied by disruptive courtroom behavior.
The court pointed out that most of the minor
disruptions during this trial occurred when the
defendants were verbally asserting their rights.
The court was willing to tolerate some measure of
confusion in the proceedings in view of the inex-
perience of the defendants in legal matters and
felt that this disadvantage may have been offset
by the greater intensity and sincerity of a defend-
ant's own presentation.
The majority also ruled that it was proper to
deny the defendant's request for an instruction on
the jury's sovereign power to reject the law as it
stands and to acquit the defendants despite evi-
dence establishing guilt. Although the jury has this
power, the majority said there was no duty to let
juries know this because this might alter the way a
jury operates.
Chief Judge Bazelon, in a concurring opinion,
argued that the sixth amendment guarantees a
criminal defendant the right to act on his own
behalf. He disagreed with the majority .opinion
on the issue of jury instructions. He pointed out
that the trial judge not ofily failed to disclose to
the jury this power to reject the law, but effectively
directed a verdict of conviction by instructing the
jury that there could be no legal defense based on
religious belief. Judge Bazelon thought that this
was not consistent with the theory of jury nulli-
fication and that the impact of the instruction was
to discourage the jury from measuring the de-
fendant's action against community standards of
blameworthiness.
728 U.S.C. §1654 (1970).
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